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Abstract
In this paper, we consider an energy provider whose goal is to simultaneously
set revenue-maximizing prices and meet a peak load constraint. The problem
is cast within a bilevel setting where the provider acts as a leader (upper level)
that takes into account a smart grid (lower level) that minimizes the sum
of users’ disutilities. The latter bases its actions on the hourly prices set by
the leader, as well as the preference schedules set by the users for each task.
We consider both the monopolistic and competitive situations, and validate
numerically the potential of this approach to achieve an ‘optimal’ trade-off
between three conflicting objectives: revenue, user cost and peak demand.
Keywords: demand response, smart grid, day-ahead pricing, demand side
management, bilevel programming, peak minimization
1. Introduction
Despite technological advancements that have allowed an increase in en-
ergy production, both traditional and green, together with a decrease of
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consumption in the residential and transportation markets, demand for en-
ergy is due to grow at a fast pace in the near future, putting at stress the
production and distribution system, as well as the supply-demand balance.
Instabilities, that trigger a chain of adverse effects for all energy users, can be
mitigated by either investing to maintain a large capacity, at a high cost, or
by implementing demand side management (DSM) programs that, through
controls at the customer level, make the best use of the current capacity [1, 2].
In short, DSM can be characterized by a set of tools for shaping the load
curve, through peak clipping, valley filling, load shifting, strategic conserva-
tion, strategic load growth and flexible load shape [3]. In order to achieve
these objectives, several programs have been put in place, such as conser-
vation and energy efficiency programs, fuel substitution, demand response,
and residential or commercial load management [1, 4, 5]. In particular, the
problem that consists of adjusting the load curve by taking explicitly into ac-
count customer reaction to prices has been addressed in several articles, such
as in [6], where residential load control through real-time pricing has been
considered. Actually, real-time pricing is frequently referred to by economists
as the most direct and efficient demand response program [7, 8, 9]. For a
thorough literature review concerning dynamic pricing, as well as analyses of
real cases, the interested reader is referred to [10].
In the present paper, we focus on peak load minimization through load
shifting. The importance of the issue can be illustrated by the example of the
United Kingdom, where the minimum load during summer nights is around
30% of the winter peak, while the average load is around 55% of the installed
generation capacity [11], emphasizing large fluctuations in the load curve,
with close to half the generation capacity being idle for long periods of time.
One foresees that the importance of load shifting will become even more
apparent when the market share of plug-in cars (fully electric or hybrid)
becomes significant. On average, PHEVs (plug-in electric vehicle) can be
driven for 5 miles per kWh [12] and hence, their intensive use may double
the average residential electric load [13], thus putting the network at risk.
In many countries, base load is produced by coal or nuclear power plants
whereas peak load is provided by natural gas, hydro or renewable power. For
this reason, electricity production during peak periods is more costly than
in the off-peak. Besides, installed production capacity has to be larger than
peak load in order to ensure power supply. Since a reduction in peak load
induces a decrease of production and capacity cost, it deserves to be analyzed
properly.
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The specific issue that this paper addresses is Energy Peak Minimization
(EPMP). It involves two decision levels: an energy provider and its cus-
tomers. These two levels have conflicting objectives. The energy provider
is interested in maximizing its revenue, whereas customers try to minimize
their total disutility. While many articles have formulated the problem as
a Nash game [13, 14, 15, 16, 17], the relationship between a company and
its customers better fits the leader-follower framework. More precisely, our
aim is to integrate demand response explicitly into the decision making pro-
cess of the energy provider. To this end, we propose a bilevel programming
approach. In this setting, the leader integrates within its decision process
the reaction of the follower. Once the leader sets his variables, the follower
solves an optimization problem, taking the leader’s decisions as given. Bilevel
programming has been used to tackle several problems including, but not lim-
ited to, toll pricing [18, 19], freight tariff setting [20, 21], network design and
pricing [22, 23, 24, 25], electric utility planning [26, 27]. One should keep
in mind that bilevel programs are intrinsically difficult (NP-hard) [28, 29].
Besides their nonconvex and combinatorial nature, the feasible region of the
leader is generally nonconvex, and can be disconnected or empty [30]. In the
context of EPMP, bilevel programming allows to integrate DSM techniques
and demand response within the optimization process of an energy provider.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a bilevel
model for peak minimization of an energy provider, with the aim to achieve
an optimal trade-off between revenue and peak power consumption without
delaying demand for electricity arbitrarily. The model uses day-ahead real-
time pricing and is solved for a global optimum. We also propose a variant
of the model that involves competing providers. Next, we analyze the rela-
tionship between the energy provider and its customers, where the latter are
inter-connected via smart metering devices (automatic energy consumption
scheduler [13]). In this environment, the customers not only share an energy
source, but also communicate with each other via the network of smart me-
ters which forms the smart grid. A detailed survey of smart grid and the
associated enabling technologies are provided in [31]. In the absence of such
technology, it would be difficult for customers to keep track of hourly prices
and shift their demand accordingly, as well as for the provider to observe
the actual demand response to its pricing strategy. Smart meters enable
two-way information flow and constitute an important feature of the system,
allowing the application of DSM techniques. While it can be argued that
metering is more expensive and may be difficult to manage for residential
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Figure 1: Residential electricity use in the USA, 2011 [34]
customers, yet it significantly decreases meter reading costs, besides assist-
ing different pricing strategies, and improved technology provides ever easier
meter management [32]. Moreover, the smart grid system allows aggregation
of residential customers with similar needs and different preferences. Since
customers can act as a large client aiming at system optimum, their bargain-
ing power is vastly increased. A survey on demand response and smart grids
can be found in [33].
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the mod-
elling framework. It is followed by experimental results involving different
parameters and instances, and a conclusion that points out challenges related
to this field of research.
2. The bilevel models
Let us consider a power sharing system involving a set of customers de-
noted by N , each one equipped with a smart metering device. Each customer
n operates a set An of electric residential appliances, such as air condition-
ers, radiators, washers, driers, refrigerators, freezers, pool heaters, etc. The
appliances can be turned on and off at any time, and their power can be ad-
justed at any desired level. In the United States, 45% of household appliance
consumption belongs to that category of preemptive devices (see Fig. 1),
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and it follows that their intelligent control may yield a significant decrease
in peak consumption.
For the sake of this study, we adopt a 24-hour planning horizon H. Each
customer n is characterized by its daily demands En,a, as well as time win-
dows Tn,a transmitted to the smart meter, one per appliance a ∈ An. The set
of such devices retrieves and transmits data, and thus forms the smart grid.
The grid is connected to a power source and receives hourly prices from the
electricity supplier, 24 hours in advance. It allows customers to benefit from
cooperation. While users are expected to have similar needs with respect to
power consumption and task scheduling, some of them might yet be more
reluctant to postpone their loads, whereas others are willing to switch to
cheaper time slots. Such behavior differences enter the model and are taken
into account by the energy provider. Precisely, the population heterogene-
ity with respect to price perception is captured by an inconvenience factor
specific to each customer.
We emphasize the importance of the smart grid as a middle agent that
takes charge of scheduling, since one may not expect the customers to monitor
prices in real time, and to optimally schedule their appliances accordingly.
In our day-ahead pricing model, the leader applies DSM to control and
smooth out the load curve. To tackle EPMP, two scenarios are considered:
monopolistic and competitive pricing, and these will be detailed in the next
two subsections. Both of them fit the bilevel paradigm, which is ideally
suited at modelling game-theoretic situations involving hierarchical players
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and takes the mathematical form:
max
x∈X
f(x, y)
s.t. y ∈ arg min
y′∈Y (x)
g(x, y′),
which usually involves two conflicting objectives. In the above model, the
leader selects first a vector x, taking the follower’s reaction y into account. In
our model, the electricity supplier sets the prices and anticipates an optimal
response from the follower. In most situations (this is the case in this paper),
the lower level problem is convex, for given x, and can thus be characterized
by its optimality conditions. If the solution to the lower level problem is
not unique, i.e., the follower is indifferent to two solutions, we assume that
the one most favorable to the leader is implemented. This is referred to
as the ‘optimistic’ approach in the literature, and is justified by the fact
that the solution can be made unique through an arbitrarily small deviation
from the optimal optimistic solution. More details on this model, as well
as the ‘pessimistic’ (one could say ‘conservative’) alternative, are provided
in [35, 36].
2.1. Monopoly Pricing
Let us consider a monopolistic electricity supplier, together with a group
of customers. Once the price decision of the leader has been set, the smart
grid automatically schedules the customer’s appliances, in compliance with
the desires of the customer, i.e., it maximizes their individual utilities.
At the upper level, the leader strives for a trade-off between revenue and
peak load by maximizing the sum of revenue minus a penalty associated with
peak consumption. This is achieved by a direct control of prices ph, one for
each time slot h ∈ H , and indirect control of the peak load Γ, which results
from the lower level solution.
At the lower level, the objective function involves two terms, namely
electricity bill (EB) and inconvenience cost (IC). For a given price vector
set by the leader, each individual customer minimizes weighted sum of EB
and IC, which clearly conflicts with the leader’s objective. To maximize its
utility, customer n selects a power level xhn,a for each appliance a ∈ An in
each time slot h ∈ Tn,a . The variable xhn,a is continuous, which corresponds
to preemptive jobs, and is bounded by βmaxn,a , the power limit of that device.
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Demand En,a and time window Tn,a = [TW
b
n,a, TW
e
n,a] of customer n ∈ N for
appliance a ∈ An is known and announced by the customer one day ahead.
Throughout the paper, it is assumed that the initial time slot of a time
window is the preferred one, and that a job cannot be performed outside its
window, i.e., xhn,a is defined only for h ∈ Tn,a . Whenever a job is postponed
within its window, a penalty that is proportional to the length of the delay,
and inversely proportional to the width of the desired time window, is in-
curred. The latter assumption reflects the fact that customers that specify
narrow time windows are likely to be sensitive to the delaying of their tasks
by the smart grid. More precisely, let λn denote the inconvenience coefficient
of a customer n, where a high value of λn is related to a low tolerance to
delay. The inconvenience cost of a job Cn,a(h) is defined as
Cn,a(h) := λn × En,a×
h− TW bn,a
TW en,a − TW bn,a
∀n ∈ N ,∀a ∈ An ,∀h ∈ Tn,a .
The bilevel mathematical model of EPMP under monopolistic pricing is
then expressed as:
(MP): max
p,Γ
∑
n∈N
∑
a∈An
∑
h∈Tn,a
phxhn,a − κΓ
s.t. Γ ≥
∑
n∈N ,a∈An
s.t. h∈Tn,a
xhn,a ∀h ∈ H (1)
0 ≤ ph ≤ phmax ∀h ∈ H (2)
min
x
∑
n∈N
∑
a∈An
∑
h∈Tn,a
(ph + Cn,a(h))x
h
n,a
s.t. 0 ≤ xhn,a ≤ βmaxn,a ∀n ∈ N , ∀a ∈ An ,∀h ∈ Tn,a
(3)∑
h∈Tn,a
xhn,a ≥ En,a ∀n ∈ N , ∀a ∈ An , (4)
where the ‘arg min’ operator has been replaced by the expression of the lower
level program, to simplify the exposition.
At the upper level of the above program, Constraint (1) forces the variable
Γ to exceed the load in each time slot. Since it is in the interest of the leader
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to minimize peak cost, Γ should match the maximum load. Constraint (2)
sets an upper bound on the prices, and might result from government reg-
ulation or market conditions. Constraint (3) is a technical constraint that
limits the maximum amount of power that an appliance may consume. For
instance, an air conditioner can be used at most at 30oC for heating and
βmaxn,a represents its power consumption at this level. Demand satisfaction is
ensured by Constraint (4).
All customers being residential users, it is natural to assume that prices
only depend on time slot h. Note that if price discrimination were allowed,
then the leader’s problem would be made much easier from the computational
point of view, since it would become user-separable. Unfortunately, in our
model, significant modifications of the schedule may arise from a single price
change, even for a single slot, thus making the problem non-trivial.
Model MP is a bilinear bilevel model involving continuous variables. Once
the leader fixes his decision variables, the lower level objective function be-
comes linear, and is thus amenable to the classical reformulation as a sin-
gle level mixed integer program (MIP) proposed by Labbe´ et al. [18] for
a network pricing problem. In this approach, the lower level’s optimality
conditions (primal feasibility, dual feasibility, complementary slackness) are
linearized and appended to the upper level to yield an equivalent MIP for-
mulation. In other words, the follower’s mathematical program is replaced
by a set of constraints that ensures the optimality of the lower level for given
upper level variables. The dual and primal constraints of the follower define
the feasible region of the follower, while complementary slackness constraints
ensure optimality. The dual variables corresponding to constraints (3) and
(4) are denoted as whn,a and vn,a, respectively, where w
h
n,a is defined only for
h ∈ Tn,a . The dual constraint corresponding to xhn,a is expressed as:
−whn,a + vn,a − ph ≤ Chn,a ∀n ∈ N ,∀a ∈ An ,∀h ∈ Tn,a .
Complementary slackness between xhn,a and the dual constraint takes the
form:
xhn,a(w
h
n,a − vn,a + ph + Chn,a) = 0 ∀n ∈ N ,∀a ∈ An ,∀h ∈ Tn,a
and can be linearized using the fact that either xhn,a or w
h
n,a− vn,a + ph +Chn,a
must be zero. Therefore, by using a sufficient large number M1 and a binary
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variable ψhn,a, one can replace the nonlinear constraint with linear ones (∀n ∈
N ,∀a ∈ An ,∀h ∈ Tn,a):
whn,a − vn,a + ph + Chn,a ≤M1(1− ψhn,a)
xhn,a ≤M1ψhn,a
ψhn,a ∈ {0, 1}.
Similarly, one linearizes the complementarity between dual variables and
primal constraints yielding two groups of constraints. In the mixed integer
linear formulation of MP, the follower’s primal constraints are given by (6)
and (7), while the dual constraint is expressed as (8). Upon the introduc-
tion of binary variables ξtn,a, the linearized complementary slackness between
Constraint (6) and whn,a corresponds to (9) and (10). Similarly, introducing
variables n,a, the complementarity between Constraint (7) and vn,a becomes
(11) and (12). Next, introducing binary variable ψtn,a, the complementarity
between Constraints (8) and xhn,a is expressed as (13) and (14). This yields,
due to the presence of identical terms (the billing cost) in the objective and
the constraints, a linear expression for the leader’s objective, and hence the
mixed integer program
9
max
p,Γ,x
w,v,ψ
−
∑
n∈N
a∈An
h∈Tn,a
βmaxn,a w
h
n,a +
∑
n∈N
a∈An
En,avn,a−
∑
n∈N
a∈An
h∈Tn,a
Chn,ax
h
n,a − κΓ (5)
s.t.
Γ ≥
∑
n,a
s.t.h∈Tn,a
xhn,a ∀h
0 ≤ ph ≤ phmax ∀h ∈ H
0 ≤ xhn,a ≤ βmaxn,a ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An , h ∈ Tn,a (6)∑
h∈Tn,a
xhn,a ≥ En,a ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An (7)
− whn,a + vn,a − ph ≤ Chn,a ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An , h ∈ Tn,a (8)
− xhn,a +M3ξhn,a ≤M3 − βmaxn,a ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An , h ∈ Tn,a (9)
whn,a −M3ξhn,a ≤ 0 ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An , h ∈ Tn,a (10)∑
h∈Tn,a
xhn,a +M2n,a ≤M2 + En,a ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An (11)
vn,a −M2n,a ≤ 0 ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An (12)
whn,a − vn,a + ph +M1ψhn,a ≤M1 − Chn,a ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An ,∀h ∈ Tn,a
(13)
xhn,a −M1ψhn,a ≤ 0 ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An , h ∈ Tn,a (14)
ξhn,a, ψ
h
n,a ∈ {0, 1}; whn,a ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An ,∀h ∈ Tn,a
n,a ∈ {0, 1}; vn,a ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An .
2.2. Competitive pricing
Now, we turn our attention to a framework involving a competitor who
declares its prices prior to the leader. The smart grid can now choose between
two options for each time slot, that is, demand of each appliance can be either
supplied by the leader, by the competitor or even by both of them. Therefore,
the smart grid decides how much power will be supplied by the leader and the
competitor in each time slot. It is important to emphasize that a customer
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does not choose a supplier for all of its demand, but rather the grid chooses
the total amount of power to be purchased from each supplier.
The main concern about hour-to-hour selection of electricity supplier is
payment calculation and collection. However, in a smart grid environment
it is automatically calculated and billed. Therefore, several suppliers may
offer prices and the most convenient one would be selected by the smart grid
operator.
In the competitive pricing (CP) setting, the leader must address several
issues. In addition to peak minimization and revenue maximization, as well
as price ceiling constraints, market shares will only be preserved if its prices
are competitive, which significantly reduces the leader’s ‘degrees of freedom’.
In the following, we assume that competitor prices p¯h are fixed, and ac-
tually assume the values phmax, without loss of generality. If they were higher,
then all customers would opt for the leader and the situation would be the
same as in model MP. If they were lower, then phmax would be irrelevant, and
leader prices would be bounded by p¯h. We also assume that the inconve-
nience factors are identical, whether electricity is supplied by the competitor
or the leader. Finally, we make the conservative assumption that, whenever
customers buy energy from the follower, they are automatically scheduled to
their most preferred time slots.
Upon the introduction of continuous variable x¯hn,a to represent the amount
of power purchased from the competitor, the bilevel program takes the form:
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(CP): max
p,Γ
∑
n∈N
∑
a∈An
∑
h∈Tn,a
phxhn,a − κΓ
s.t. Γ ≥
∑
n∈N ,a∈An
s.t. h∈Tn,a
xhn,a ∀h
0 ≤ ph ≤ phmax ∀h ∈ H
min
x,x¯
∑
n∈N
∑
a∈An
∑
h∈Tn,a
(ph + Cn,a(h))x
h
n,a
+
∑
n∈N
∑
a∈An
∑
h∈Tn,a
(p¯h + Cn,a(h))x¯
h
n,a
s.t. xhn,a + x¯
h
n,a ≤ βmaxn,a ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An , h ∈ Tn,a
(15)∑
h∈Tn,a
xhn,a + x¯
h
n,a ≥ En,a ∀n ∈ N ,∈ An (16)
xhn,a, x¯
h
n,a ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ N , a ∈ An , h ∈ Tn,a ,
where Constraint (15) is rearranged so that the device limit is not exceeded.
Constraint (16) includes the amount of energy x¯hn,a that is purchased from
the competitor, and ensures that demand is satisfied no matter which firm
is the provider.
Similar to the previous model, this program can be expressed as a sin-
gle level MIP. Following the previous notation, dual variables whn,a and vn,a
are associated with (15) and (16), respectively. Next, the primal, dual and
complementary slackness constraints of the lower level are appended to the
upper level, while the strong duality of the lower level is utilized to linearize
the objective of the leader:
max−
∑
n∈N
a∈An
h∈Tn,a
βmaxn,a w
h
n,a +
∑
n∈N
a∈An
En,avn,a −
∑
n∈N
a∈An
h∈Tn,a
p¯hx¯hn,a
−
∑
n∈N
a∈An
h∈Tn,a
Cn,a(h)(x
h
n,a + x¯
h
n,a)− κΓ.
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Due to the additional lower level variables x¯hn,a, we must incorporate ad-
ditional dual constraints, together with their complementary slackness con-
straints. These are linearized as in model MP (∀n ∈ N ,∀a ∈ An ,∀h ∈ Tn,a):
−whn,a + vn,a ≤ Chn,a + p¯h
x¯hn,a × (whn,a − vn,a + p¯h + Chn,a) = 0.
3. Experimental Results and Interpretation
In this section, we demonstrate the applicability of our approach through
a number of numerical experiments involving various scenarios. The base case
(BC) corresponds to setting all prices at pmax and scheduling all appliances
to the preferred time slots. Results of BC, MP and CP models are compared
in terms of peak cost, peak load, net revenue, billing and inconvenience costs.
The scenarios involve 10 customers, each one controlling three preemptive
appliances regulated by the smart grid. The scheduling horizon is composed
of 24 time slots of equal duration.
The sensitivity of the models are tested with respect to two parameters:
peak weight κ and time window width (TWW), which is related to customer
flexibility.
Two key parameters enter the model. First, peak weight κ reflects the
importance to decrease peak load for the leader. A higher weight translates
into a larger penalty, hence a higher effort to smooth out the supply curve.
Next, time window width (TWW) provides the leader with some flexibility to
induce job shifting through price adjustments, and thus indirectly smoothing
out the load curve. Sensitivity of the model with respect to both parameters
has been assessed, with κ assuming values ranging from 200 to 1000, with
increments of 200, and TWW increased by 20% or 100% with respect to the
minimum completion time
MCT :=
⌈
En,a/β
max
n,a
⌉
.
MCT denotes the minimum number of time slots required to meet demand
En,a if we could set all devices at their maximum level β
max
n,a . For experimental
purposes, 10 instances are randomly generated for each value of κ. In order
to test TWW, similar jobs are used with different widths of time windows.
In each scenario, parameters βmaxn,a and En,a are uniformly generated for
customer n and appliance a. Then, the early time slot of time window
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Table 1: Cost Comparison of models MP and CP on 20% TWW instances (BC = 100%)
κ MP EB MP IC MP TC CP EB CP IC CP TC
200 78.02 21.49 99.51 78.31 21.17 99.48
400 77.15 21.59 98.74 78.01 20.13 98.14
600 75.76 21.85 97.61 77.84 18.74 96.58
800 73.52 22.16 95.68 78.07 16.81 94.88
1000 71.50 22.48 93.99 77.63 16.28 93.91
Average 75.19 21.91 97.10 77.97 18.63 96.60
for customer n and appliance a, TW bn,a is generated within 0 and 24 −
d(1 + TWW )×MCT e. The end of time window for customer n and appli-
ance a, TW en,a takes the value TW
b
n,a+d(1 + TWW )×MCT e. For instance,
let βmax and E be equal to 2 and 8, respectively, for a given customer n,
and appliance a. Then, its MCT is 4 hours. If TWW is 1.0, then its time
window can start at some time slot in {0,. . . ,16} and must end 8 hours later.
If TWW is 0.20, then TW bn,a belongs to the interval {0,. . . ,19} and TW en,a is
TW bn,a + 5.
Although all customers are residential users, they may have different lev-
els of sensitivity to delay and hence, they may behave differently. There-
fore, a random inconvenience coefficient λn is generated for each customer n.
As mentioned earlier, the inconvenience penalty function Cn,a(h) is directly
proportional with λn and demand En,a, and inversely proportional to time
window width. Hence, when λn assumes a low value, customers are less
delay-sensitive, which gives the model more flexibility to find a good sched-
ule. Alternatively, when λn assumes a large value, certain time slots become
too costly and will almost never be selected. Note that in real life, λn can
be either selected by customers or a value can be assigned to each customer
based on past data.
Both models are solved with CPLEX version 12.3 on a computer with
2.66 GHz Intel Xeon CPU and 4 GB RAM, running under the Windows 7
operating system. Whenever an instance could not be solved within the time
limit of 4 hours, the best integer solution has been considered.
The first numerical results are displayed in Tables 1 and 2. They involve
10 random instances of 30 jobs, in both the monopolistic (MP) and com-
petitive (MC) cases. The user costs are split between electricity bill (EB)
and inconvenience cost (IC), both percentages being relative to the base case
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Table 2: Cost Comparison of models MP and CP on 100% TWW instances (BC = 100%)
κ MP EB MP IC MP TC CP EB CP IC CP TC
200 85.12 14.16 99.28 85.25 14.06 99.30
400 82.87 14.55 97.42 84.05 13.90 97.95
600 80.13 15.29 95.42 84.67 12.69 97.35
800 75.67 16.29 91.96 84.33 11.84 96.17
1000 74.95 16.44 91.39 83.70 11.45 95.15
Average 79.75 15.35 95.10 84.40 12.79 97.19
(BC). For instance, the first line of Table 1 indicates that in model MP,
out-of-pocket cost is 78.02% and inconvenience cost is 21.49% of the total
cost corresponding to BC, the total (TC) being 0.5% less than in BC, for
which the billing cost is the higher. Average values over all parameters and
instances are displayed in the final row. Models MP and CP results in a 2.9%
and 3.4% total cost reduction, respectively for 20% TWW instances and a
4.9% and 2.8% total cost reduction for 100% instances. All values are less
than 100%, which reflects a cost improvement for customers for any peak
weight value.
In comparison with the base case, the leader sets lower prices in order
to shift some jobs to the off-peak hours, hence customers’ bill is naturally
reduced and inconvenience cost is increased. When peak weight κ is large, the
leader is willing to give up some revenue in order to achieve a smoother load
curve. Hence, it lessens the bill as well. Note that EB is lower in model MP
than in model CP whereas IC is higher. When the leader is a monopolist, he
has to provide service to all customers. However, in the competitive case, it
has the option to give up on some load in order to decrease the peak without
lowering prices. According to this reasoning, IC increases as κ increases in
both tables for model MP, whereas it decreases for model CP.
Although the total cost of the follower for 20% TWW instances is lower
in the presence of competition, it is not the case for 100% TWW instances,
and there lies an interesting fact. For instance, suppose that peak consists
of a light-load and a heavy-load job alongside others, and that they are
both required to be shifted in order to decrease the peak. Keeping in mind
that the heavy-load job has a high inconvenience cost, the leader would
have to decrease the price at least by that amount in the monopolistic case.
Then, the light-load job would enjoy a price reduction that is larger than
15
Table 3: Comparison of models MP and CP with 20% TWW Instances
Av Comp Time Av Gap # unsolved
(κ) MP CP MP CP MP CP
200 1.10 1.20 0.00% 0.00% 0 0
400 3.10 3.50 0.00% 0.00% 0 0
600 6.80 13.10 0.00% 0.00% 0 0
800 8.90 56.60 0.00% 0.00% 0 0
1000 17.90 63.00 0.00% 0.00% 0 0
Table 4: Comparison of models MP and CP with 100% TWW Instances
Av Comp Time Av Gap # unsolved
(κ) MP CP MP CP MP CP
200 28.10 321.10 0.00% 0.00% 0 0
400 339.50 592.67 0.00% 0.55% 0 1
600 2040.20 1232.88 0.00% 3.87% 0 2
800 4666.40 2350.67 0.00% 3.73% 0 4
1000 7707.00 2034.14 0.00% 6.04% 0 3
its inconvenience, and the total cost would be lower for the light-load job
and identical for the heavy one. In contrast, the leader can now give up on
the heavy-load job in the competitive case and decrease the price only with
respect to the light-load job. Hence, total cost would stay the same for both
jobs. This is valid mostly for large time windows, because there are far fewer
options for job shifting in 20% instances.
In Tables 3 and 4, the computational results of model MP and CP are
compared for 20% and 100% TWW instances, respectively. Average com-
puting time (in seconds), the average optimality gap of unsolved instances,
and the number of unsolved instances are presented. As aforementioned, the
running time limit is set to 4 hours (14 400 seconds) and the values displayed
in the tables are the average computation time over all instances that could
be solved within 4 hours.
In both tables, the average computation time of both models increases
together with peak weight κ, since the leader is more willing to modify its
prices in order to smooth out the load curve, providing extra room for im-
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Figure 4: Peak Load Comparison
provement. The average gaps and number of unsolved instances also support
this argument. In addition, one can observe that average computation time is
larger in Table 4. Large time windows induce high running times, since there
are more options to consider. Another important point is that, on average,
model CP takes longer to solve if we include the unsolved instances. This
result can be explained by the increased combinatorics, the leader having
the additional alternative to provide energy for a job or leave it to the com-
petitor. In accordance with real life, competition makes the decision process
more challenging.
Peak cost, peak load and net revenue (objective function value of leader)
comparisons of model MP and CP to BC for 20% instances are shown in
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Figure 5: Net Revenue Comparison
Figures 3(a), 4(a) and 5(a), respectively. Similar values are shown for 100%
instances in Figures 3(b), 4(b) and 5(b). The x-axis consists of the peak
weight parameter κ and the y-axis represents the monetary value in Figures 3
and 5, whereas it represents peak power usage in Figure 4. In Figure 3, it
can be observed that peak costs for models MP and CP increases slower than
the peak cost of BC, as weight κ increases. Since there is a possibility of not
satisfying some of the demand for the leader in model CP, peak load and
hence peak cost is lower than in model MP, as expected. In Figures 3(a)
and 3(b), it can be observed that peak cost decreases in model MP when
time windows are wide, whereas it does not change much in model CP. In
accordance, in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), it is clear that peak load decreases in
model MP. As a result, net revenue in model MP increases considerably when
time windows widen.
We now turn our attention the the leader’s revenue. Average net revenue
of BC is dominated by that of model MP, and the latter is dominated by
CP. Both bilevel models provide a higher net revenue despite the discount
on some prices. In view of the peak cost constraint, the leader can adjust
its pricing strategy to increase total revenue. Perhaps more surprising, it
can benefit from an open market by willingly letting demand flow to the
competition, for the sake of meeting the peak constraint. It is important
to note that the model behavior is very similar in both the 20% and 100%
instances. On average, model MP provides a 13.71% and 24.34% net revenue
increase with respect to BC on 20% and 100% TWW instances, respectively.
Meanwhile, model CP provides a 38.31% and 40.31% net revenue increase
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with respect to BC on 20% and 100% TWW instances, respectively.
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Figure 7: Price Comparison
Different load shapes are handled differently by the model. If the initial
load curve has a single ‘high’ peak, then it attempts to assign attractive prices
around the peak to shift some of the load to later periods. However, when
there are more than one peak, the shifting issue becomes more complex. Load
distributions with respect to different values of κ of an instance under model
MP and 100% TWW are shown in Figure 6(a). When κ is less than 400,
the model ignores the peak at time 12 and focuses on the one at time 10.
However, as κ increases, the model tries harder and harder to level the load
curve around both peaks. In Figure 7(a), where the corresponding price
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vectors are displayed, low prices illustrate the effort of the leader to shift
jobs around. The magnitude of price reduction escalates as κ increases.
Besides, it is again clear that prices around the other peak start moving
when κ exceeds the value 600. These two graphs provide a better picture
of how an energy provider can achieve an optimal trade-off between revenue
maximization and peak minimization.
When model CP is solved on instances of Figures 6(a) and 7(a), load
distribution and prices change as shown in Figures 6(b) and 7(b), respectively.
The leader leaves some load to the competition in return for lower peak
value. By applying this strategy, it manages to keep prices higher than
in the monopolistic case and achieves a smaller generation capacity. It is
further observed that the leader tries to decrease peak to the level of the
second highest load value (SHL). In order to achieve this, two strategies are
exercised: if the time slot following peak hour has small load, then the leader
opts for shifting some load to that time slot. Else, if the difference between
peak load and SHL is larger than the difference between SHL and the load at
the time slot following the peak, then the residual is left to the competition.
4. Conclusion
Maintaining an efficient supply-demand balance in the residential energy
market is a difficult task, due to variability of the demand. In order to
guarantee stability during peak periods, providers must install very large
capacities, or resort to costly imports. In order to address this issue, we in-
vestigated a hierarchical framework where the leader optimizes the weighted
sum of revenue and peak penalty, given that the smart grid optimizes cus-
tomer choice. Since electricity generation requires large investments, both
for capacity building and maintenance, it is frequently handled by a private
monopolist, independent or not of the state. This corresponds to our first
model. However, along with technological developments in the renewable
energy generation and PHEVs, one can foresee the advent of smaller players,
hence the relevance of our second model.
In this paper, we have shown that day-ahead energy pricing can be a pow-
erful tool in terms of DSM when a smart grid system is incorporated into the
system. A more efficient energy supply system is designed by flattening load
curve without requiring a drastic change of habits from customers. By using
pricing as a design mechanism, an optimal trade-off between revenue and
user cost can be quantified in both a monopolistic and competitive situation.
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By performing sensitivity with respect to the peak load parameter, insight
into efficient regulations could be achieved.
Throughout our study, we have assumed that customers are not compet-
ing with each other, but rather behave as a cooperative that devolves the
decisions to the smart grid, providing them with bargaining power. Ana-
lyzing EPMP under different assumptions, as well as developing heuristic
algorithms that scale better than exact methods are two issues that will be
addressed in subsequent works.
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